With the fall of the Soviet Union, the strategic rationale for an independent British deterrent has collapsed; I find it extraordinarily difficult to envision a scenario in which a country could lob a nuke at London without triggering a response from either Washington or Paris. Prestige considerations are also relevant for nuclear weapons, and the continued French possession of SSBNs may make British abolition untenable, but nuclear weapons also have a lot more domestic enemies than aircraft carriers.I'd like to think that if we did get rid of the SSBN fleet we'd spend the savings on something other than giant motherfucking warships, but even that seems like a positive exchange.
Also, Hilzoy's choice to retirement may well be the best choice for her, and I wish her well, but she had a nice line in logic and humour that I'm going to miss.
10 comments:
It's incredibly short-sighted to argue that the nuclear deterrent became obsolete when the Soviet Union collapsed. The current unipolar world we live in is a historical aberration: we're already witnessing the rise of China (and to a lesser extent India) as superpowers. Hopefully we will always have cordial relations with them, but the whole point of the armed forces is to plan for the case where we don't. If you accept the premise that it was strategically necessary during the cold war, then it will surely be strategically necessary again in the future.
The moral question, of course, is another matter.
Indeed, you can't count on the status quo not changing.
For example in 1918 if someone told you Germany would dominate Europe again in twenty years you would have laughed at the suggestion.
Thinks change and getting rid of your deterrent on the bet that things won't change is short sighted.
"It's incredibly short-sighted to argue that the nuclear deterrent became obsolete when the Soviet Union collapsed. The current unipolar world we live in is a historical aberration: we're already witnessing the rise of China (and to a lesser extent India) as superpowers. Hopefully we will always have cordial relations with them, but the whole point of the armed forces is to plan for the case where we don't. If you accept the premise that it was strategically necessary during the cold war, then it will surely be strategically necessary again in the future."
I'm not arguing the nuclear deterrent per se is obsolete, and neither is Farley, he's arguing the British deterrent is obsolete. We have the States, and arguably more importantly given our EU member status, we have France. As does Germany, Italy, and so on. Are all of them making tactical mistakes not maintaining their own deterrent? Or is the scenario in which we find ourselves on the crappy side of a nuclear power and separated from France and the States (on whom our deterrent is fairly dependant anyway) a) vanishingly small, and b) a situation in which we're screwed in any case, just on the level of conventional forces?
"Indeed, you can't count on the status quo not changing."
There is a difference between assuming the status quo will not change, and insisting every scenario be prepared for, at massive expense, just because we can't prove it won't happen. And once again, the implicit argument here is that every country should have nukes, just in case. I would argue that this is a massively dumb idea, and explicitly what the NPT was designed to stop. Which, of course, is another reason to consider scrapping (or at least seriously downsizing) our nuclear stockpile.
"For example in 1918 if someone told you Germany would dominate Europe again in twenty years you would have laughed at the suggestion."
I doubt it. The very fact we put so much effort in attempting to hobble Germany following the war is proof that she was still considered a potentially major threat. Our plan to stop it happening again failed, but we certainly weren't unaware of the possibility.
Moreover, would people laugh now if I suggested terrorists might get hold of one of our own nukes and use it against us? The practice of throwing around scenarios with tiny but positive probabilities works both ways.
"Thinks change and getting rid of your deterrent on the bet that things won't change is short sighted.Thinks change and getting rid of your deterrent on the bet that things won't change is short sighted."
Like I said, it isn't a bet things won't change, it's a bet things won't change to a massive extent, won't change too quickly for us to restart a nuclear program (this point is in truth the most plausible part of the argument in isolation, but still adds slightly to the implausibility of the whole), won't change to a point where America no longer agrees to protect us but still, for some reason, allows us the technology to keep maintaining our nukes (which under this ludicrous hypothesis might end up pointed at them), adds in the idea that every non-nuclear country in the world are chumps, and then binds all of that up in the additional assumption that things won't change in other ways that either make our nuclear weapons a suboptimal spending choice at best, and massively self-defeating at worst.
"I'm not arguing the nuclear deterrent per se is obsolete, and neither is Farley, he's arguing the British deterrent is obsolete."
But this more limited argument also falls by the same token: if a British deterrent was necessary during the cold war, it will also be necessary in the future. There is no question of "becoming obsolete".
Further, what right do we have to rely on America or France for our defence? Why should their citizens pay for it, and we not? We should at least feel obliged to make a substantial financial contribution, and then why not just have an independent deterrent?
It's nonsense to compare us with "Italy, Germany and so on". There are obvious historical reasons why they don't have nuclear weapons, which we don't share.
Further, your suggestion that it would be better to restart a nuclear weapons programme when necessary is very dangerous. Imagine the situation where we decide to start building nukes again after a foreign country threatens us in some way. That would, of course, be taken as a threat in itself, and a dangerous upping of the ante. It's far more judicious to keep the deterrent through good times and bad.
"But this more limited argument also falls by the same token: if a British deterrent was necessary during the cold war, it will also be necessary in the future. There is no question of "becoming obsolete".
Well, no. If British deterrent was necessary during the Cold War, it theoretically could be necessary in the future. That is not the same thing, and the word "obsolete" does not imply something can never again be useful under any hypothetical scenario.
In any event, I'm not too interested in pushing the point, since I'm not sure whether the UK deterrent itself actually was useful, even during the Cold War.
"Further, what right do we have to rely on America or France for our defence? Why should their citizens pay for it, and we not? We should at least feel obliged to make a substantial financial contribution, and then why not just have an independent deterrent?"
This seems a strange way to formulate your point. Again, if this logic applies to us, it applies to every country in Europe. Using the EU budget to subsidise the missiles would make far more sense than every country having its own deterrent, which is why your argument that paying the French is equivalent to having our own nuclear weapons isn't particularly convincing.
Moreover, the "right" to be protected by France isn't really the issue from France's perspective, so much as the obvious negative consequences to France if Britain is nuked. This is also why "what if" scenarios that separate us from Paris are so strained; they rely not on France no longer giving a damn about the EU or treaties, but them no longer giving a damn about radioactive fall-out and/or wind.
As regards to the Americans, there have been multiple examples in history of us bending to their will for fear of pissing them off too much (ironically, this is one of the reasons Callahan chose not to try and dismantle our deterrent back in the late seventies), so the Americans already benifit from the arrangement. This does lead to the possibility of arguing losing our nukes would make us more beholden to the States, but since we use their technology to create our missiles in any event, its debatable that we're in the superior position right now anyway.
"It's nonsense to compare us with "Italy, Germany and so on". There are obvious historical reasons why they don't have nuclear weapons, which we don't share."
Nonsense? Not in the least. You are arguing relying on the US France is a bad idea. If it's a bad idea for us, then relying on the US, France and Britain is a bad idea for anyone else (unless you want to argue that two countries is silly, but three is fine?). This is a strategic consideration independent of why countries that have no nukes are in that position.
"Further, your suggestion that it would be better to restart a nuclear weapons programme when necessary is very dangerous. Imagine the situation where we decide to start building nukes again after a foreign country threatens us in some way. That would, of course, be taken as a threat in itself, and a dangerous upping of the ante. It's far more judicious to keep the deterrent through good times and bad."
My argument was not that we would restart the program when a country threatened us, it was that it would restart when this ludicrous "abandoned by everyone" scenario came into effect. Were that to happen, BTW, there would be far more countries than just us that would start building nukes, which is another reason why the scenario is vanishingly unlikely; France withdrawing will just lead to a desperate struggle for its former allies to suddenly become far more dangerous.
Power struggles between nations still exist. Do you really want to give up Britain's permanent seat on the security council? Leaving it 2:2 for the stable democracies who are meant to have weapons and 3:5 for the stable democracies versus antagonistic unstable countries? (And I'm being generous to India there). By removing Britain from these equations and leaving them with nothing but economic sanctions and a tiny army as teeth you are completely changing the situation you believe won't change.
How often do we ever agree on military action with France and the US? How often do we agree on nearly any action?
Germany can be a scary economic force, but do you really think an itinerant North Korea cares that much? The point that Italy and Germany lack nukes mostly for historic reasons is a fair one. Because the same root attitudes to the military and Germany's place as a military force still exist to this day, even if NATO wouldn't object to them obtaining nuclear weapons now. Relying on France, US and Britain isn't great but we are disparate enough to maintain checks and balances (Iraq anyone?). Just France and the US? Or what if France decides Britain made a good decision and opts out? Just the US? *shudders*
Yes nukes are immoral, none of us should have them (unless aliens or cylons become likely) and the money could be spent elsewhere. But this is a status-quo that is far messier than I think you have considered.
"Do you really want to give up Britain's permanent seat on the security council?"
Our position on the Security Council is not conditional on us having nuclear weapons, nor did we possess them when we joined. I accept that all things being equal, I would far rather we keep our place there, and some serious negotiation would have to go into maintaining it if we gave up our deterrent (ironically, mainly to placate the US and France), but it is most certainly not as simple as no nukes = no seat.
"How often do we ever agree on military action with France and the US? How often do we agree on nearly any action?"
I don't understand your point. What does it matter whether we agree with the French or the US over military action? It's not like we were planning on using our own nukes in unilateral actions, is it? And once again, this argument applies to every other country in the EU, and they seem perfectly OK with picking and choosing what they're going to do.
"Germany can be a scary economic force, but do you really think an itinerant North Korea cares that much?"
M'eh. Korea has already used up 25% of its potential fissionable material in two tests, neither of which were entirely successful, they can't get their ICBM tech to work worth a damn, and without our nukes there would still have two different nations ready to wipe them off the face of the planet (including, as mentioned, one country who has a choice between defending us, allowing nuclear winds to ravage their North East territory, or trying to cut their way clear of mainland Europe). I'm not really relying on Germany as the controlling factor.
(There are also credible, if slightly far-fetched suggestions that the second test may have been faked, but that's a point for another time).
"The point that Italy and Germany lack nukes mostly for historic reasons is a fair one. Because the same root attitudes to the military and Germany's place as a military force still exist to this day, even if NATO wouldn't object to them obtaining nuclear weapons now."
That's still dodging the point. They may well be making a tactically poor choice for historical reasons, but it's still the case that under the arguments presented by Tomsk and Gooder, they are making the wrong choice. I would like to see that acknowledged, rather than being reminded why they are in the position they are.
In fact, public opinion is very much against acquiring nuclear weapons all across Europe. I don't think that a show of hands should really have anything to do with tactical decisions on this level, but it ain't just Italy and Germany who are against it (though I grant immediately that many of the countries who don't want nukes couldn't afford or maintain an independent deterrent in any case.)
"Relying on France, US and Britain isn't great but we are disparate enough to maintain checks and balances (Iraq anyone?). Just France and the US? Or what if France decides Britain made a good decision and opts out? Just the US? *shudders*"
Wait, you're argument is that if Britain removes its deterrent, France might as well? We need at least one of something, so best have two in case we decide to have zero? I think this is the first time I've seen the "slippery slope" argument applied to nuclear disarmament.
I'm also surprised you brought up Iraq, since all that proves as far as I can see is that having the US and France as counterpoints is a good idea. Britain's use as a "balance" in that case was distinctly limited.
Our position on the Security Council is not conditional on us having nuclear weapons. I accept that all things being equal, I would far rather we keep our place there, and some serious negotiation would have to go into maintaining it if we gave up our deterrent(ironically, mainly to placate the US and France), but it is most certainly not as simple as no nukes = no seat.'
Are you really certain? Many other countries would see it as the perfect opportunity to take 'our' seat and rightly so. Remove Britain's deterrent, almost certainly remove their power within the security council and see what happens. Risky to say the least. Nothing ironic about placating France and the US. We'd be furious if they left us holding the baby (missile).
'I don't understand your point. What does it matter whether we agree with the French or the US over military action?'
Because they can launch an attack as well as a response. Because they can use their 'threat' to sway political and economic decisions. They are viewed and treated as *nuclear powers* and that isn't something taken lightly. If being a nuclear power is not something to concern yourself about when dealing with a country why are we worried about Iran and North Korea? So France and the US look stable and sensible now. Things change. If 9/11 had been 10 or 100 times worse what might George W have threatened to do or done? We don't know.
' (including, as mentioned, one country who has a choice between defending us, allowing nuclear winds to ravage their North East territory, or trying to cut their way clear of mainland Europe). I'm not really relying on Germany as the controlling factor.'
Exactly, but you want to rely on someone else. Not someone you have an actual say in. Germany has no control. Without nuclear weapons neither do we. You want to rely on France's sense of self preservation. And therefore you are just as happy to rely on their negotiating teams, voting ability,funding, economy, internal security, intelligence, technical capacity and the fact that you will always agree with their foreign policy.
'In fact, public opinion is very much against acquiring nuclear weapons all across Europe)'
And how many of those countries would like it if we gave up our deterrent? Sure we can join them in the little league of world politics and feel morally smug, whilst we watch France and the USA try and bring pressure down on despots who want some new toys. Safe in the knowledge that we have no say in how or why they do it. I'm not saying it's a good idea to become a nuclear capable nation, I'm saying it's a bad idea to upset the balance and stop being one. Being a nuclear nation and a permanent security council member is a powerful, expensive and responsible position. Germany would be the ideal choice for a nuclear nation, but it doesn't require a deterrent defensibly and ultimately is too neutral in it's foreign policy (for historical reasons) to want to be active otherwise, which is why I pointed to it as an example.
' I think this is the first time I've seen the "slippery slope" argument applied to nuclear disarmament.'
Why not? If you hand over our defence to the French, then you should expect that they might change their policy too. After all you can't stop it. Plus, just how powerful would the French decision to maintain it's deterrent be? They want better deals or more seats within the EU so they can maintain their military budget (that you have no say in)? Are you going to say no? We already essentially use our nuclear ability as a form of political blackmail, are you going to enjoy being on the receiving end?
'I'm also surprised you brought up Iraq, since all that proves as far as I can see is that having the US and France as counterpoints is a good idea. Britain's use as a "balance" in that case was distinctly limited.'
Iraq is a fair point, not only because western powers disagreed but it has had an impact on relationships with all countries. Britain didn't bring balance, France did. Maybe next time it'll be the other way around. My point is that if the stable democratic nations with deterrents can disagree over a course of action (and that can mean firing a nuke, responding to a nuke, presenting a united deterrent, sending negotiators) it limits the chances of a 2 sided stand off. It maintains debate and hopefully a reasonable and well thought through outcome. I'm trying to point out that having a nuclear deterrent is not just about being able to fire back. It's about balances, political power, scientific knowledge, capacity, economy, history and negotiating.
The world can change and it can change quickly. The States has already flirted with isolationism over the economic crisis when someone put forward a clause in their recovery bill and things aren't even that bad economically in comparision to previous downturns.
As Kim points out removing our deterrent would be a massive change in the geo-political situation in of itself.
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